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1. INTRODUCTION
This symposium appears at a key moment in the development
of international secured credit law.' The presence, both in person
and in publication, of a large number of scholars and practitioners
devoted to assisting the development is heartening. Moreover, it
stands in stark contrast to the situation only a decade or two ago
when most of those interested in this topic could have fit com-
fortably in a large telephone booth.
Rather than simply congratulating ourselves on our prescience
or good judgment in choosing to study this area, though, we
should survey the terrain. In particular, in considering what can
be done to facilitate international secured transactions, we should
familiarize ourselves with what might be called the Scenario of
'99. In the Scenario of '99, we find that:
* Professor of Law, Brooklyn Law School. This article was supported by a
Brooklyn Law School Summer Research Stipend.
' It also occurs at a key moment in the international development of do-
mestic secured credit law, but that topic is beyond the scope of this article.
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" different jurisdictions have widely different legal systems to
govern secured credit;
" commerce among these jurisdictions is rapidly growing;
" financial transactions to support the growing commerce are
lagging behind that commerce (perhaps because, in major part,
of the legal friction resulting from inconsistent legal regimes);
and
* legal friction resulting from inconsistent legal regimes is of
two types: first, the law differs from jurisdiction to jurisdic-
tion, and second, even within a particular jurisdiction, the
rules differ depending on the type of the security device util-
ized.
The problems associated with this Scenario of '99 are obvious.
Solutions are needed to facilitate the flow of commerce between
jurisdictions.
Before jumping to any conclusions as to the nature of the ap-
propriate solutions to the problems identified in the Scenario of
'99 and the identity of the organizations best situated to effectuate
them, however, a word of caution is in order. The Scenario of '99
described above is the Scenario of 1899, not 1999, and the jurisdic-
tions referred to are the states of the United States rather than na-
tions of the world.2
Those engaged in the study of secured credit under Article 9
of the Uniform Commercial Code ("UCC") tend to think that
the U.S. system of unified and uniform rules governing security
interests sprang full grown from on high, but as Professor Grant
Gilmore reminded us, with some modesty on his part, "only in
myth does Minerva spring fully armed from Jove's brow."3 In-
deed, in the United States, it took over a half century of some-
times fitful progress from 1899 to achieve our present state of
domestic near-uniformity with respect to secured credit across
both state lines and differing types of transactions.
Professor Gilmore, in his classic treatise SECURITY INTERESTS
IN PERSONAL PROPERTY, extensively analyzed pre-UCC secured
transactions law and its development over time. Gilmore identi-
fied eight different personal property security devices used in the
United States in the late nineteenth century and early twentieth
2 The author also explored this theme in a lecture sponsored by the Uni-
versity of Vienna in October 1996.
3 1 GRANT GILMoRE, SECURrrY INTERESTS IN PERSONAL PROPERTY 291
(1965).
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century.4 These devices were the pledge, the chattel mortgage,
the conditional sale, the trust receipt, the factor's lien, field ware-
housing, security interests in intangible property, and accounts
receivable financing.' While the law governing each of these de-
vices traveled a different route to the current state of unified and
uniform law, the general stories are similar. In these earlier days
the rules differed from device to device and from state to state,
with any fitful movements toward uniformity developing only
over time.
With respect to pledges and chattel mortgages, for example,
not only did the rules differ from state to state, but the rules es-
tablishing the distinction between the two devices were unclear.6
In a well-known early case, Judge Learned Hand noted that:
It is everywhere agreed that the significant distinction be-
tween a pledge and a mortgage is that in the first the credi-
tor gets no title, but what is vaguely called a "special prop-
erty," while in the second he does.... If only the forms
of the transaction were observed by the courts, it would
be easy to distinguish a pledge from a mortgage, because
any absolute grant must be a mortgage, and any other
agreement for security must be a pledge.
No such convenient rule can be drawn from the books
It seems to me very difficult to find any rule which the
cases will bear out, and the whole matter floats nebulously
in that fog, "the intent of the parties," but of which courts
are so apt to evoke what they most want.'
Among the differences recognized in many states between the
rules governing pledges and those governing chattel mortgages,
those related to the rights of late perfecting pledges or mortgagees
4 See id. at3.
s See id. at xiii.
6 See generally id. at 4-5 (comparing the pledge and the chattel mortgage).
7 German Publication Soc'y, 289 F. 509, 509-10 (S.D.N.Y. 1922), aff'd 289
F. 510 (2d Cir. 1923).
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as against intervening creditors present an interesting comparison.
New York, Illinois, and Washington, for example, all recognized
distinctions in this area between pledges and mortgages, but New
York recognized different distinctions than did Illinois and Wash-
ington.'
Matters did evolve over time, however. Gilmore noted the
example of the "stock in trade" mortgage, one example of a type
of pledge or chattel mortgage transaction: "By the end of the
[nineteenth] century, it was clear that no judicial consensus would
ever be achieved, even within the limits of a single jurisdiction." 9
Yet, by 1940, "most states" had resolved matters similarly, and
the problem "ceased to be a burning issue." 0
With respect to conditional sales, the origins of the doctrine
appear to be in the common law, but by the time of the enact-
ment of UCC Article 9, only a handful of states continued to
govern conditional sales as a common law device.1 Over time,
some states enacted the Uniform Conditional Sales Act, while
others regulated conditional sales through their retail installment
sales acts. 2
The law governing trust-receipt financing appears to have
reached some degree of uniformity relatively early. While the
origins of this device, like the others, were in the common law,13
it has "no history or genealogy that can be traced further back
than the last quarter of the nineteenth century."'4 Moreover, an
influential Uniform Act- the Uniform Trust Receipts Act- was
promulgated in 1933 and was enacted in a majority of states.
Thus, the path from nothingness to chaos to uniformity was un-
usually brief in the case of this device.
8 See GILMORE, supra note 3, at 6-7 (comparing New York law as exempli-
fied by Karst v. Gane, 136 N.Y. 316 (1893) and Parshall v. Eggert, 54 N.Y. 18
(1873) with the law of Illinois as exemplified by Johnson v. Burke Manor Bldg.
Corp., 48 F.2d 1031 (7th Cir. 1931) and Washington as exemplified by Whiting
v. Rubinstein, 109 P.2d 312 (Wash. 1941)).
9 GILMORE, supra note 3, at 46.
10 Id. at 47 (noting the example of stock in a trade mortgage).
n See id. at 63.
12 See generally J. Glenn Donaldson, An Analysis of Retail Installment Sales
Legislation, 19 ROCKY MTN. L. REV. 135 (1947); William E. Hogan, A Survey
of State Retail Installment Sales Legislation, 44 CORNELL L.Q. 38 (1958).
13 See Karl T. Frederick, The Trust Receipt as Security, 22 COLuM. L. REV.
395 (1922).
14 GILMORE, supra note 3, at 86.
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In the case of factors' liens, a common law device gradually
came to be covered by statute in most states. New York, for ex-
ample, first dealt with this area by statute in Section 45 of the
Personal Property Law, enacted in 1911.5 The statute was fre-
quently amended, but for almost thirty years it appears that New
York had the statutory field to itself. From 1938 to 1947, though,
nineteen states passed factors' lien acts, 16 and the 1950s saw seven
additional states enter the fold.17 These acts, though, unlike the
trust-receipt statutes, were not uniform from state to state. Gil-
more states that they were "recognizably the same statute in sub-
stance, but they offered an amusing collection of local and re-
gional tastes and styles in drafting." 8
Field warehousing law followed still another path. As Gil-
more explained:
Field warehousing.., was nothing to get excited about;
nothing for the legislatures to be concerned with; nothing
that anyone would be tempted to describe as a great feat of
the legal imagination. It was merely a remarkably success-
ful security device that managed to exist for nearly half a
century before anyone realized that it was there. 9
Once the legal system did realize that field warehousing was
there, however, it apparently was content to resolve issues on a
case-by-case basis through common law analysis rather than by
statute.
The law governing security interests in intangible property,
such as accounts receivable, developed slowly, primarily through
case law. In the 1940s, however, a large number of states enacted
accounts receivable acts to govern the area by statute. The devel-
opment of doctrines in this area was quite contentious and by no
means uniform."
As this brief historical excursion indicates, uniformity did not
come easily or quickly in the United States. Indeed, with the ex-
ception of trust-receipts financing, it would be difficult to con-
15 See 1911 N.Y. Laws ch. 326, S 1.
16 See GILMORE, supra note 3, at 139 n.1.
17 See id. at n.2.
11 Id. at 141.
19 Id. at 146.
20 See generally id. SS 7.1 - 8.8.
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clude that pre-UCC law for any of these security devices was uni-
form at any level deeper than the superficial. Moreover, before
the promulgation of the UCC in the 1950s, there were no serious
attempts to unify the legal treatment of security devices. Thus,
the U.S. journey from late nineteenth century chaos to the cur-
rent state of relative grace was neither quick nor smooth.
2. CREATING PROFITABLE TRANSACTIONS
Why do people care about the law governing secured credit?
The simple answer is -that credit is an engine of economic growth.
Yet, credit will be extended only when the credit transaction is
profitable for both parties- the creditor and the debtor.
How are profitable transactions constructed? The borrower
will see a potential extension of credit as profitable if the it antici-
pates a greater return on the loaned funds than it will pay in in-
terest.21  For the creditor, direct profits derive from interest
charges in excess of the its time value of the money or its cost of
funds.2
Obviously, individual extensions of credit are profitable for
creditors only when their debtors fulfill their obligations, and the
aggregate of credit extensions is profitable only if the profits from
the transactions in which the borrowers fulfill their payment ob-
ligations are greater than the losses from those in which the debt-
ors do not fully repay the credit. Accordingly, the possibility of
nonpayment is a key determinant of the profitability of a credit
transaction. Why does nonpayment occur? As I have noted
elsewhere:
While in some cases a debtor's failure to fulfill his or her
obligations is due to dishonesty or unwillingness to pay,
much more often the failure springs directly from inability
to perform. Inability to fulfill one's financial obligations,
21 Since the anticipated return is a constant, obviously the interest rate to
be charged in the transaction plays the major role in determining whether the
borrower sees the transaction as profitable.
'2 The creditor may also profit indirectly from the extension of credit,
such as when the credit finances profitable sales (that might not otherwise have
occurred) of the creditor's products or services to buyers. Many transactions
generate profits for creditors both indirectly and directly- enabling a profit-
able sale that may not otherwise have taken place andmaking a separate profit
from the interest charged to the customer.
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of course, is part of the classic definition of insolvency.
Thus, the risk of debtor insolvency is a major (perhaps the
major) determinant of whether a credit transaction will be
seen as profitable for the creditor.'
Accordingly, if a creditor believes that the risk of non-
payment associated with a particular proposed extension of credit
is too high, that extension of credit will not take place. This is
the case because non-payment in the transaction in question
would not only make that transaction unprofitable, but it would
also offset the gains from many other transactions in which the
debtors fully pay their debts.2' By similar analysis, a creditor con-
sidering extending credit in a class of similar transactions will not
do so if the risk associated with individual extensions of credit
within that class is too high. In making such a decision, the credi-
tor will note that even if the chance that any one debtor will de-
fault is relatively low, a small number of projected defaults will
yield a negative expected value for the entire class.
It might appear that the creditor can ameliorate the problem
of losses from debtor default simply by raising the interest rate so
that the profits from the transactions in which the debtors pay
are high enough to outweigh the losses from those in which the
debtors default. This solution can work only in a narrow range,
though. After all, raising the interest rate makes it less likely that
the credit transaction will be profitable for the borrower. If the
borrower does not see the transaction as profitable, it will not
take place. Thus, when the risk of loss from debtor insolvency is
high, it will be difficult to construct a credit transaction in which
both parties foresee profits.
The history of credit, consequently, has involved the search
for mechanisms to lower expected insolvency losses in order to
lower the interest charges required for profitability for the credi-
tor and thereby to facilitate the possibility of transactions that are
profitable for debtors as well. Secured credit, along with surety-
' Neil B. Cohen, Harmonizing the Law Governing Secured Credit: The Next
Frontier, 33 TEx. INT'L L.J. 173, 174 (1998).
24 Indeed, the loss associated with a defaulting debtor is typically several
times larger than the profit generated by a debtor that fully performs its obliga-
tions. For further analysis of this point, see generally id.; Neil B. Cohen,
Credit Enhancement in Domestic Transactions: Conceptualizing the Devices and
Reinventing the Law, 22 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 21 (1996).
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ship and guaranty devices, represents a mechanism to effectuate
this solution.
3. THE NEED FOR A LEGAL FRAMEWORK
The availability of secured credit, especially in legal cultures
where it is largely absent, can be a great spur to economic
growth.' Yet secured credit cannot exist without a legal frame-
work to support it.
While secured credit transactions are created by contract, con-
tract law standing alone is insufficient to supply this legal frame-
work. The reasons for this are at least three-fold. First, the value
of secured credit springs from the secured party's claim to the col-
lateral not only as against the debtor but also as against other po-
tential claimants. These claimants can include other secured
creditors, lien creditors, buyers of the collateral, and, most impor-
tantly, a bankruptcy trustee. None of these other potential
claimants is a party to the contract by which credit is extended
and a security interest created. Thus, it is not possible to use con-
tract theory to establish the rights of the secured creditor as
against these other claimants. Second, even as between the debtor
and the secured creditor, there are rights that may well be too
important to leave to the bargain of the parties in light of possible
inequalities in bargaining power.26 Third, without a body of law
to establish default rules,' secured credit contracts would need to
be of great (and often inefficient) complexity.
To support secured credit effectively, a legal regime must ad-
dress three distinct issues. First, the regime must determine how
a debtor and creditor may create inter se an enforceable agreement
that certain property of the debtor will serve as collateral for the
debtor's obligation." Not only must the necessity of such for-
malities as signed writings be addressed, but also such issues as the
25 See Heywood Fleisig, The Power of Collateral: How Problems in Securing
Transactions Limit Private Credit for Movable Property, PuB. POL'Y FOR
PRIVATE SECTOR, n. 43 (Apr. 1995).
26 Under Article 9 of the UCC, most post-default rights of debtors are not
waivable in the contract creating the security interest. See U.C.C. § 9-501(3)
(1995); U.C.C. S 9-602 (1999).
' The term "default rules" does not mean rules governing the parties after
the debtor's default, but, it represents rules that govern in the absence of an
agreement between the parties.
2' This matter is dealt with domestically in U.C.C. S 9-203 (amended
1999).
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ability of debtors to encumber disparate items of property in a
single grant of a security interest and the ability to encumber an-
ticipatorily property not yet owned by the debtor.
Second, a secured credit regime must set out the ground rules
for enforcement of the secured party's interest after default by the
debtor. For example, how may the secured party obtain physical
possession of the collateral (if it is tangible) or control of the col-
lateral (if it is not tangible)? May self-help be utilized, or must the
secured party resort to the courts? What limits exist on the
methods by which the secured party reduces the collateral to
money and applies that money to the debtor's obligation?29
Third, and perhaps most important, a secured credit regime
must delineate the rights of the secured party as against other
claimants of the collateral. A security interest that is enforceable
against the debtor, but is subordinate to the rights of another se-
cured creditor or of a lien creditor, has much less economic value
than an interest that is superior to those competing rights. Both
moral and economic value judgments are required to determine
the rules that establish priority among competing claimants.
4. THE INTERNATIONAL LANDSCAPE
The approach of various legal systems to these fundamental
legal issues of secured credit varies widely. While many nations
have detailed secured credit law, the choices made by many civil
law countries often differ significantly from the United States'
approach and vary internally depending on the type of collateral
involved.3" The legal systems of countries with less fully devel-
oped economies often understate secured credit issues.31 Finally,
29 Article 9 of the UCC addresses these issues in Part 5 of the 1995 text and
Part 6 of the 1999 amended text. The Article 9 rules, largely favoring self-help
reptossession and non-judicial sales, contrast dramatically with the law in many
other countries where the enforcement rules often prevent a secured creditor
from reducing the collateral to cash (or having a court do so) until the eco-
nomic life of the goods has essentially expired. See, e.g., Office of the Chief
Economist of the Latin and Caribbean Region, World Bank Publication, No.
13873, How Legal Restrictions on Collateral Limit Access to Credit in Bolivia, at
18-19 (1994), available in The World Bank Group (visited Sept. 10, 1999)
< http://www.worldbank.org/pics/eco/13873.html >.
" See, e.g., Carl S. Bjerre, International Project Finance Transactions: Selected
Issues UnderRevised Article 9,73 AM. BANKR. L.J. 261, 268 & n.26 (1999).
31 See, e.g., Harvard & Center for the Economic Analysis of Law, Study:
Thailand, Center for the Economic Analysis of Law, Publications <http:]/
www.ceal.org/publications.html> (forthcoming publication).
U. Pa. J. Int'l Econ. L.
countries only recently making the transition from socialist
economies to market economies do not always rank development
of secured credit law as a high priority."
As practical barriers to international commerce fall, there is a
concomitant need for credit, particularly secured credit, to sup-
port this newly developing commerce and for law to support this
credit. Moreover, it has been said (with only some exaggeration)
that the world is divided between those regions in which the
dominant economic feature is money looking for uses, and those
in which the dominant economic feature is uses looking for
money. It would seem that in a well-functioning market, money
and uses would meet but, once again, an effective legal system
supporting such a meeting must exist and be effective.
The differences among today's legal regimes governing secured
credit (and the lacunae in many existing regimes) create many in-
efficiencies. With these inefficiencies, the cost of credit increases
and the likelihood of profitable transactions decreases. The cost
of credit increases for at least the following four reasons: (1) in an
international transaction, there is substantial uncertainty as to
which jurisdiction's law will govern various aspects of a secured
transaction;33 (2) the cost of acquiring knowledge of the laws of
the jurisdiction that will govern the transaction can often be high;
(3) the jurisdiction that will govern the transaction may have laws
that are uncertain, adding an element of risk to the transaction;
and (4) the governing jurisdiction may have laws that do not ef-
fectively promote secured credit.
Can these costs be lowered through international lawmaking?
The precedents are not positive. Almost thirty years ago, the
United Nations Commission on International Trade. Law
("UNCITRAL") retained Professor Ulrich Drobnig of the Max
Planck-Institut fur Auslindisches und Internationales Privatrecht
[The Max Planck Institute for Foreign and Private International
Law] to submit a study on the legal principles governing security
interests in the various legal systems of the world.34 One function
32 For example, Poland has enacted a comprehensive secured credit law
while the Ukraine has no post-Soviet secured credit law.
" See History: The Creation of the United Nations Commission on Interna-
tional Trade Law (UNCITRAL), [1970] 1 U.N. Comm'n on Int'l Trade L.Y.B.
5,13-14 U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/SER.A.
" See Report of the Secretary-General: Study on Security Interests, [1977] 8
U.N. Comm'n on Int'l Trade L.Y.B. 171, 173, U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/SER.A.
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of the study was to assess the need for, and perhaps prospects for,
accomplishing harmonization in this area of the law.
The study, published in 1977, comprehensively examined the
law of nineteen nations, noting the similarities and differences
among them in their treatment of basic legal issues in secured
credit." Not surprisingly, the differences were great. More im-
portant for the present purposes, though, the Drobnig report also
contained assessments to "help to consider the necessity or desir-
ability of framing rules in this field on an international level, es-
pecially for the international movement of goods subject to secu-
rity interests."36
As part of these assessments, Professor Drobnig catalogued
prior attempts to achieve some degree of international uniformity
with respect to security interests. These attempts included: (1) a
uniform conditional sales act enacted by three Scandinavian coun-
tries (Norway, Sweden, and Denmark) during 1915-1917; (2) the
UNIDROIT draft provisions of 1939 and 1951 concerning the
impact of reservation of title in the sale of certain goods; (3) pro-
visions in the draft European Economic Community Bankruptcy
Convention of 1970 regarding the effect in bankruptcy of reserva-
tion of title in the sale of goods; and (4) model reservation of title
clauses contained in several "General Conditions" elaborated by
the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe."
Professor Drobnig also analyzed at some length two recent (at
the time of his study) proposals for the harmonization of secured
credit law that had been submitted to the Council of Europe.
The first such proposal was made by UNIDROIT in 1968; the
other was submitted by the Service de recherches juridiques com-
paratives of the Centre National Recherche Scientifique of Paris
in 1972.38 Together, these proposals put forth a range of possible
unification efforts, from the "maximum" solution of creating a
uniform security interest for international cases to the much nar-
rower suggestion for a uniform document accompanying motor
vehicles on which security interests could be entered. In addition,
Professor Drobnig noted the existence of a proposal to the Euro-
35 See id.
36 Id.
37 See id. at 208-10.
31 See id. at 210.
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pean Community as to the establishment of a central register for
security interests.39
These attempts are unified primarily by their ineffectiveness
in resolving non-uniformity in the law governing security inter-
ests.
Moreover, Professor Drobnig's analysis of those limited
precedents did not engender optimism on his part about the like-
lihood of framing international rules governing security interests.
With respect to the prospects of a uniform law convention, he
concluded:
It would seem that international legislation in the form of
a convention providing uniform rules of substantive and
conflicts law is not appropriate in this case. As against in-
ternational sales or international transportation or the in-
ternational circulation of negotiable instruments, transna-
tional incidence of security interests is as yet relatively
moderate. It would probably be difficult to obtain suffi-
cient government support for an international conference
dealing with the relatively technical topic of security in-
terests; and even if the text of an international instrument
could be agreed upon, national parliaments would proba-
bly be slow and perhaps even reluctant to ratify such a
text.40
Professor Drobnig also took a negative view towards develop-
ing recommendations for nations to adopt rules that would pro-
mote uniformity. "Mere recommendations, even if emanating
from an international organization of the highest repute, will not
command sufficient moral or other support for adoption by any
sizable number of States." 41
Only with respect to the possibility of developing a model
law in this area was Professor Drobnig's view less bleak. Even
3 See id. (citing Federation bancaire de la Communaute economique eu-
ropeenne, Projet de Convention relativeaux effets extraterritoriaux des saretis mo-
bities sans dessaissemen).
40 Report of the Secretary-General: Study on Security Interests, [1977] U.N.
Doc. A/CN.9/131, 4.2.1, at 218, reprinted in 8 Y.B. Int'l Trade L. 171, 218
(1977); [1977] U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/SER.A/1977.
41 Id. 4.2.3.
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there, however, he tempered his relative optimism with doubt,
suggesting: "Perhaps moral persuasion or intellectual insight into
the virtues of the model rules will move some States to adopt
them. Others may need persuasion by more effective means such
as insistence on the part of international financing institutions."42
5. ARE =E PROSPECTS BETTER IN 1999?
The pessimism of Professor Drobnig in 1977, however
strongly justified at the time, should not be assumed to be equally
valid in 1999. After all, much has changed in the twenty years
since the Drobnig study. Not only have practical barriers to in-
ternational commerce decreased dramatically in the intervening
years, but there have been other developments as well, not all of
which could have been anticipated in 1977.
For instance, other nations have joined the United States in
enacting secured credit laws reflecting the concepts and policy
choices on which Article 9 of the UCC is based.' In addition,
the fall of command economies following the collapse of most
communist regimes has resulted in opportunities for the whole-
sale rewriting of the commercial laws of many countries in order
to make market economies workable." Also, organizations out-
side the United States, such as the European Bank for Reconstruc-
tion and Development ("EBRD"), have drafted and proposed for
adoption model acts governing secured transactions.4" The EBRD
Model Act is particularly significant because it is compatible with
the structure of the secured transactions system created by UCC
Article 9 and, therefore, deviates from many traditional European
norms. Further, the World Bank and other organizations have
42 Id. 4.2.2.
4' The enactment in most anglophone Canadian provinces of Personal
Property Security Acts based on similar concepts to those in UCC Article 9
represents such an example. See The Personal Property Security Act, ch. 73,
1967 S.O. 305 (Ont.); see also Jacob S. Ziegel, The New Provincial Chattel Secu-
rity Law Regimes, 70 CAN. B. REV. 681 (1991) (discussing provincial property
security legislation).
" The role of CEELI (the ABA Center for Eastern European Law Initia-
tives) has been particularly prominent here.
41 See EUROPEAN BANK FOR RECONSTRUCTION AND DEVELOPMENT,
MODEL LAW ON SECURED TRANSACTIONS (1994).
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actively pushed for modernization of the secured credit laws of
many nations.46
While many of these initiatives are still in progress and uncer-
tain of success, modernization and harmonization are no longer
far-fetched dreams. Nonetheless, the difficulties in developing in-
ternational secured credit law, even in 1999, should not be mini-
mized. Two fundamental aspects of the American legal terrain in
1899 which contributed to the successes of the ensuing half cen-
tury are absent from the world scene in 1999. First, with the ex-
ception of Louisiana, all of the United States base their legal sys-
tems on our English inheritance. By way of contrast, the nations
of the world, unlike the states of the United States, do not share a
common legal heritage. Second, in the American constitutional
structure, it is clear that the economic unit is the nation as a
whole.4" As a result, the United States may be said to share a pre-
disposition toward unified and uniform approaches to economic
law. Quite obviously, there is no such international predisposi-
tion.
6. RECENT INITIATIVES: UNCITRAL AND UNIDROIT
As the other papers for this symposium explore in more de-
tail, the most important recent developments in the field of inter-
national secured transactions are today's primary topics- the
UNIDROIT initiative with respect to interests in mobile goods48
and the draft UNCITRAL convention regarding receivables fi-
nancing.49
Unlike comprehensive secured credit regimes such as UCC
Article 9, both projects have a limited focus- seeking to establish
rules to govern only one type of collateral. In this regard, they
draw from the U.S. experience (albeit probably not intentionally)
46 See, e.g., Office of the Chief Economist, Latin America and Caribbean
Region, supra note 29, at 18-19.
47 See U.S. CONST., art. 1, § 8, cls. 1-3, 5.
48 See Text of the Preliminary Draft UNIDROIT Convention on Interna-
tional Interests in Mobile Equipment as Reviewed by the Drafting Committee, in
First Joint Session Report, Unidroit CGE/Int.Int./WP/16, ICAO Ref.
LSC/ME-WP/27 app I (Feb. 12, 1999).
" See Text of the Preliminary Draft Protocol to the Preliminary Draft
UNIDROIT Convention on International Interests in Mobile Equipment on Mat-
ters Specific to Aircraft Equipment as Reviewed by the Drafting Committee,
UNCITRAL, U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/WG.l/WP.104 (1999) [hereinafter
UNCITRAL Receivables Project].
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by seeking uniformity and modernity first in a limited context. If
these projects are successful, perhaps they can serve as the basis
for broader-gauged unification of secured credit law in the future.
Indeed, starting narrowly, as these projects do, may well increase
the chances of such broader success in the future.
Both of these projects concern areas of secured finance in
which there exists a consensus of sorts that uniform international
rules are necessary, or at least worthy of serious consideration.
This certainly increases the chances of success for the projects, es-
pecially by contrast to broader based reforms, which do not seem
to have engendered the same level of support in the international
context.
Will topic-specific harmonizations pave the way for broader
unification and harmonization of the law governing secured
credit? While the U.S. experience suggests optimism, there are, of
course, as noted above,50 many differences between harmonizing
within a relatively homogenous national legal and business cul-
ture and harmonizing across economic and cultural, as well as le-
gal boundaries.
7. UNCITRAL AND UNIDROIT: DIFFERENT
APPROACHES TO DIFFERENT PROBLEMS
While the UNCITRAL and UNIDROIT projects are similar
in that they focus on only one type of collateral, their approaches
differ in significant ways. The UNIDROIT project focuses on
objects that can move internationally in a literal sense. The rules
that are being developed focus on several basic questions with re-
spect to that object: (i) how to create an interest in the object, (ii)
how to enforce an interest in the object, and (iii) how to deter-
mine the relative priority of interests in the object."'
Most importantly, and in contrast to the UNCITRAL proj-
ect, the rules being considered to resolve these questions are, in-
deed, international substantive rules. The UNIDROIT project
will provide answers to the questions delineated above, and those
answers will apply to all transactions within their scope. In par-
ticular, priority matters will be settled through the use of an in-
ternational registry in which interests within the scope of the
convention can be noted.
10 See supra Part 2.
51 See UNCITRAL Receivables Project, supra note 49.
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The proposed UNCITRAL convention differs from the
UNIDROIT project in at least two major ways. First, while its
scope, like that of the UNIDROIT project, is defined by a type of
collateral, the UNCITRAL convention's rules focus more on the
parties than on the property. While this may be natural given the
wide variety of economic rights that may fall within the defini-
tion of receivables, it does lead to some different emphases. For
example, consider the different roles of filing systems. In the
UNIDROIT project, the filing systems that are contemplated
would be indexed by property-- that is, a creditor seeking to lend
against a piece of mobile equipment such as an airplane would
search an index organized by airplane to see if any other creditor
claimed an interest in that airplane. By contrast, under the op-
tional filing system proposed in the UNCITRAL convention,52
the creditor would search an index organized by debtor (like do-
mestic UCC Article 9 indices) and, if an entry is found for the
debtor, the creditor would then examine the entry to determine if
it covered the receivables in question. 3
The more fundamental difference between the UNCITRAL
convention and the UNIDROIT project, however, lies in the
UNCITRAL basic approach to uniformity. While the core rules
of the UNIDROIT project are substantive in nature, this is not
always the case with respect to the UNCITRAL convention. In
fact, the convention does not determine the core rules regarding
interests in receivables- the relative rights of competing claim-
ants to those receivables. Rather, the convention merely tells us
which nation's law will determine priority.'M In other words,
rather than providing a substantive solution to its key issue, the
UNCITRAL convention gives only a conflict of laws pointer.
The reasons for this limited approach to resolving such a key
issue are twofold. First, and most directly responsible, is the sim-
ple fact that the Working Group drafting the UNCITRAL con-
vention was unable to agree on a substantive priority rule. As a
general matter, individual delegations consistently advocated for
the priority rules similar to those in effect in their nations. Since
at least three different strands of priority rules for receivables are
52 See id. at Annex I & H.
5 As noted below, the fact that the filing system is optional reflects of an
important difference between the two proposed conventions.
See generally Steven L. Schwarcz, Towards a Centralized Perfection System
for Cross-Border Receivables Financing, 20 U. PA. J. INT'L ECON. L. 455 (1999).
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represented by members of the Working Group,5 a consensus did
not emerge.
Second, and perhaps more important, a convention priority
rule that is inconsistent with the domestic priority rules of some
nations would create an unstable situation with uncertain impacts
on domestic transactions. Consider the case of a German account
creditor56 whose debtor" is also located in Germany. Under
German law, if that account creditor assigns the same receivable
twice, the assignee of the first assignment would have priority.
Assume, though, that the convention adopted a substantive prior-
ity rule pursuant to which the first assignment to be registered
would have priority. This situation would leave us with two
simple priority rules and one very difficult question.
The first simple priority rule would mean that between two
German assignees of that receivable, the assignee of the first as-
signment would have priority because the convention would be
inapplicable because neither assignment met the convention's cri-
teria of internationality. 8 The second simple priority rule would
be that, as between two non-German assignees of that receivable,
the assignee of the first assignment to be registered would have
priority because the convention would apply to both of these in-
ternational assignments.
What would happen, though, if the account creditor assigned
the receivable twice- once to a German assignee and once to a
non-German assignee? To make the question more challenging,
assume that the assignment to the German assignee occurred first,
but that the non-German assignee registered its assignment while
the German assignee did not. If the convention priority rule ap-
plies, the non-German assignee will have priority because its as-
" For example, priority in the United States and Canada, among others, is
dependent on registration in a public registry. See U.C.C. § 9-322 (1999);
U.C.C. § 9-312 (1995). Priority in France, on the other hand, is dependent on
the time of notification of the account debtor, and priority in Germany is de-
termined by the time of the assignment of the receivable.
5 While Article 9 labels this party the "debtor," the UNCITRAL conven-
tion would call this party the "assignor." See U.C.C. § 9-102(a)(28) (1999);
U.C.C. § 9-105(1)(d) (1995); UNCITRAL Receivables Project,supra note 49,
art. 2.
"' While Article 9 labels this party the "account debtor," the UNCITRAL
convention would simply call this party the"debtor." See U.C.C. § 9-102(a)(3)
(1999); U.C.C. S 9-105(1)(a) (1995); UNCITRAL Receivables Project, supra
note 49, art. 2.
58 See UNCITRAL Receivables Project, supra note 49, art. 2.
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signment was the first (and only) one registered. If the domestic
German rule applies, the German assignee will have priority be-
cause it was the assignee of the first assignment.
How would this conflict between a substantive convention
priority rule and substantive domestic priority law be resolved?
The conflict cannot be avoided. After all, it would be absurd or
meaningless to conclude that the German priority rule applied to
the assignment to the German assignee. A priority rule applied to
the assignment to the non-German assignee because a priority
rule resolves a conflict between two assignments; it cannot apply to
only one assignment. Thus, only one of the two priority rules
can apply.
If the German priority rule applies to this conflict, the result
is quite unsatisfying. While the German assignee obviously
would be delighted, application of the rule would render the con-
vention meaningless. After all, it would bring about a situation in
which an assignee that takes all the actions necessary to have first
priority under the rules of the convention would nonetheless lose
to a competing party that did not take those actions and whose
existence might not be easily ascertainable. Thus, despite the sub-
stantive priority rule of the convention, the international assignee
would always be subject to the vagaries of domestic priority law.
This would vitiate any value from the convention priority rules.
A potential international assignee would be required to ascertain
and apply local priority rules in order to determine whether its
interest would have first priority, undermining the transactional
planning role of the convention rule.
If the convention priority rule applied to this conflict,
though, a different problem would result. Even though the Ger-
man assignee, by virtue of its first-in-time status with respect to its
assignment, would win under domestic German law (the only law
applicable to its assignment), it would nonetheless lose because it
did not take a step (registration) relevant only to international as-
signments under the convention. Thus, the assignee of the purely
domestic assignment, to whom the convention is not applicable
by its own terms, would nonetheless have to comply with the
convention to assure its priority. The result would be a substan-
tive convention rule which, by its terms, only governs interna-
tional interests but which, in practice, must be followed in purely
domestic transactions as well.
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In light of the unsatisfactory results that would follow when-
ever there would be a potential conflict between domestic prior-
ity rules and substantive convention priority rules, it may well be
the case that substantive convention priority rules would be inad-
visable even if the members of the Working Group could achieve
a consensus.
8. BROADER PROJECTS ON THE HORIZON: THE ALl AND THE
OAS CONSIDER SYSTEMATIC INTERNATIONALIZATION
The UNCITRAL and UNIDROIT projects both follow a
gradualist approach that parallels early U.S. development of the
law governing security interests. Yet, there are those who are in-
terested in considering the possibilities of broader-based reform.
The most prominent of those groups considering the pros-
pects of long term harmonization is the American Law Institute
("ALI"). The ALI recently instituted an International Secured
Transactions Project. As stated in the prospectus for this project:
The goal of the proposed International Secured Transac-
tions Project would be to promote and assist the develop-
ment of effective and efficient legal regimes for secured
transactions in the contexts of international law, United
States domestic law, and the domestic law of other na-
tions. The Project would seek to accomplish that goal
through both participation in the United States compo-
nent of international lawmaking and facilitation of the de-
velopment of domestic secured transactions regimes in
other nations. This could be accomplished through both
institutional involvement in various lawmaking processes
and the development of substantive products to aid those
processes. Such products could include (1) an articulation
of the economically beneficial goals of secured transactions
law in a credit economy; (2) preparation of a Restatement-
like "Principles of United States Law of Secured Transac-
tions"; (3) articulation of criteria for an efficient, effective,
and appropriate legal regime governing secured transac-
tions; (4) analysis and articulation of the need for, and op-
erational issues with respect to, notice filing systems; (5)
preparation of a model secured transactions code for en-
actment as the domestic law of a nation; and (6) prepara-
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tion of a model international secured transactions law to
govern international secured transactions in an integrated
and comprehensive fashion. 9
While the International Secured Transactions Project is not
committed to preferring broad harmonization initiatives over the
gradualist approach, it is clear from this statement of goals that
the project is oriented toward facilitating the long term goal of
broad harmonization.
Even more recently, the Organization of American States
("OAS") announced that it was considering a project to develop
an inter-American convention on security interests.6' The plan
for that convention suggests that it will be more broadly based
than either the UNCITRAL or UNIDROIT projects. Indeed, it
is likely that the OAS project will be heavily influenced by the
work of The National Law Center for Inter-American Free Trade
of the University of Arizona, which has been developing a model
secured credit law for Mexico over the past several years.
In any event, we are getting ahead of ourselves. This sympo-
sium and the remaining articles in this volume address the current
efforts. The task of future reformers cannot be fully understood
until the fate of the current efforts becomes clearer.
" Neil B. Cohen, The International Secured Transactions Project: A Proposal
and Outline (1997) (on file with author).
0 See Organization of American States, Law Experts Prepare for CIDIP-VI
(visited Dec. 7, 1998) <http://www.oas.org/sp/pinfo/week/weekrep.htm>.
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